Amid sustained criticism of the failure of multilateralism, the first quarter of the 21st century has seen multilateral organizations expand in both scope and mandate. The Gaza Board of Peace (BoP), touted by the US administration as an international organization, was announced, signed, approved, and ratified at Davos on January 22 to support the reconstruction of post-conflict Gaza.
Although the BoP signing ceremony did not mention the UN mandate, the US Secretary of State, in a January 28 deposition before the Senate Committee, stated that the UN had established the BoP. The speed, secrecy, and strategies employed by the Trump administration to prepare, substantiate, and disseminate the Gaza BoP as an international organization require scrutiny, particularly from the democratically elected governments that are signatories.
At the very least, the Gaza Board of Peace, as it is promoted, does not comply with the basic tenets of an international organization, in letter and in spirit.
From the outset, can the Gaza BoP be classified as an international organization? If so, could it sideline or overshadow the UN Peacebuilding Commission? Let’s examine the genesis and characteristics of the Gaza BoP so far.
With considerable hype, the announcement and signing of the Gaza BoP at a business jamboree in Davos revealed its initial intent: whether it was a temporary business project or a permanent international entity, and whether the BoP represents the intent to address the social, economic, and political rights of Gaza’s destitute. Imitating the UN logo, while substituting the olive branch with the laurel, the Board of Peace logo features a map of the Western Hemisphere with the U.S. as the pivot. In fact, the laurel branch is the symbol of victory. Is Gaza geographically or economically situated in the Western Hemisphere? Surprisingly, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office had sought trademark protection for the BoP emblem before the Davos signing ceremony.
The US president described the BoP as ‘the greatest and most prestigious Board ever assembled at any time, any place’. The Gaza BoP was first conceived by the Trump administration in the Comprehensive Plan to end the Gaza conflict (29 September 2025). The BoP, chaired by President Trump and comprising other members and heads of state, was proposed as an international transitional oversight body for the reconstruction and rebuilding of Gaza. With BoP, an apolitical and technocratic transitional Palestine committee and a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) were to be formed for Gaza.
Consequently, on 17 November 2025, the UNSC adopted a resolution establishing the Gaza BoP, as proposed in the Comprehensive Plan, and designating it as a transitional international, independent entity to oversee efforts to rebuild Gaza until December 2027. The UNSC is mandated to extend the BoP beyond 2027. Despite its status as an independent international entity, the Gaza BoP shall report to the UNSC every six months after its establishment.
However, such a pity that the charter of the calibre of Gaza BoP has not been in the public domain, neither in the US nor in the signatory countries, including Indonesia. The deliberations/commentaries to date are based on a single source (The Times of Israel, 18 January, 2026) of the so-called Charter of the BoP. If that is the Charter we are going to abide by, which is global in scope, not confined to Gaza, it includes the accumulation of immense power of appointing and firing members or executive staff by the self-appointed Chairman, the US President Trump (Canada was the first exemplary victim of denial of membership), and a high membership fee.
As a result, there is confusion regarding its geographical scope, timeline, and membership criteria. It should be noted that President Trump will vacate the White House at the end of his second term in 2028; therefore, the timeline for BoP membership is 3 years, and the cost for permanent membership is 1 billion USD. Will the Gaza BoP continue after 2028 without UNSC approval and after the Trump presidency? Are these criteria for an international organisation? Has the Charter or draft Charter of the BoP been shared with signatory countries in advance?
It’s reported that the Charter has been sent to the heads of government as an attachment to the invitation letter to join the BoP a few days before Davos. Indeed, there have been no consultations with countries that have signed so far, not even with Capitol Hill, the Senate and Representatives in the US, as found out in the Senate Committee hearing on 28 January. A fundamental feature of an international organisation is that the Charter is prepared collectively. If the BoP is the same as that adopted in the UNSC Resolution (2025), it has not yet been qualified as an international organisation, as claimed by the Trump administration.
Surprisingly, besides the US and Bahrain, the four permanent members and nine non-permanent members of the UNSC, who voted and adopted the UNSC Resolution, have not signed the charter of the Gaza BoP in Davos. The majority of the members were signed without knowing their roles, functions, or terms of engagement. While it’s being promoted that participation is only by invitation to the BoP, other varied reasons that cannot be ruled out are: a) threat of unilateral trade tariffs, b) aligning trade potential with the US, c) domestic compulsions, and d) a faint ambition of becoming a regional power. It is reported that 63 countries were sent notice, not an invitation, as announced by the President of the US, to join the Gaza BoP in Davos. While 20 countries signed during the signing ceremony, more than a dozen countries expressed their intent to join the BoP. 22 countries, including India and European countries, received invitations but didn’t respond before the signing in Davos. Although Canada was invited, the invitation was later withdrawn by the US. 12 EU member states declined the invitation. Is this the UNSC-sponsored independent transitional legal entity?
If one closely decodes the Davos signing ceremony, it was the self-appointed Chairman, Trump, of the Gaza BoP, who literally ‘paraded’ the leaders invited to the signing ceremony. When Chairman Trump entered the podium, the leaders seated and waiting there had to stand and clap as vassal states. This is not a democratically representative and equally shared forum aimed at rebuilding Gaza. Even the US Secretary of State, in his speech at Davos, mentioned that many Christian and Muslim countries are part of this BoP. Is it a criterion for the reconstruction mission in Gaza?
While the UNSC mandated a US-led Gaza BoP to consolidate financial commitments and address security concerns in Gaza as an independent transitional entity, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), a 31-member intergovernmental advisory body, continues to play an advisory role in reconstruction and rebuilding in post-conflict areas worldwide. The PBC was established in 2005 by the UN General Assembly and Security Council to collectively arrange resources and advise on integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. The 31 members are elected from the UNSC, UNGA, and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The PBC, or, for that matter, any UN-backed collective peace efforts, have their own limitations, including a lack of funds, delayed decisions and ground actions, and are embroiled in power politics. But these collective peace efforts are democratically arrived at.
The Gaza BoP, in its present form, must not replace the UN-backed peace-building efforts across the globe. Neither the BoP is qualified as an international organisation with a global mandate. At best, it seems a board for profit. Despite its transitional, transactional, and temporary nature, a transparent, shared, and inclusive Gaza BoP fulfils the aspirations of the people of Gaza.
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Dr Avilash Roul is a Senior Fellow at the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict (SSPC), New Delhi. This article is republished from SSPC under a mutual content sharing collaboration. Read the original article here. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of IndiaVerve.
